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The implementation of the October 3 agreement adopted at the six-party talks is now being delayed and there are forces floating misinformation that the DPRK is to blame for this.
They assert the need for the talks to adopt a verification document to which the collection of samples, etc. is added, claiming that the DPRK-U.S. Pyongyang agreement on the verification issue is insufficient.
Some media assert that the opening of the talks of heads of delegations to the six-party talks is delayed and the tempo of economic compensation by five parties is affected by it because the DPRK has not responded to the above-mentioned proposal.
This is a product of the ill-boding moves to put psychological pressure upon the DPRK and wrest concession as regards the verification issue while ignoring the essence of the situation.
The DPRK is, therefore, compelled to clarify the points agreed upon by the DPRK and the U.S. as regards the verification issue during the Pyongyang visit by the U.S. assistant secretary of State early in October.
The DPRK and the U.S. shared the view on the peculiar situation the DPRK is facing as regards the verification issue, to begin with.
The DPRK pulled out of the NPT and the IAEA and conducted a nuclear test outside the NPT, declaring its access to nukes. The six-party talks are at the second phase for the implementation of the September 19 joint statement.
This is the peculiar situation defining the way and scope of verification concerning the nuclear declaration at the phase of disablement.
A written agreement was thus reached on the verification measures to be taken on the premise that the October 3 agreement will be fully implemented to ensure the accuracy of the nuclear declaration.
It is the keynote of the agreement that objects of verification would be confined to the Nyongbyon nuclear facilities to be finally dismantled under the February 13 agreement and the October 3 agreement, both reached in 2007, the method of verification would be also confined to field visit, confirmation of documents and interview with technicians and the verification be conducted after the economic compensation is completely wound up under the October 3 agreement.
This was utmost magnanimity the DPRK could show under the present situation where the deep-rooted mistrust and hostile relations exist between the DPRK and the U.S.
It is an act of infringing upon sovereignty little short of seeking a house-search for the above-said forces to insist on adding even a word except the written agreement reached between the DPRK and the U.S. with much effort, persistently calling for the application of so-called "international standard" without taking the present level of confidence in the relations between the two countries still technically at war into consideration. This infringement upon the sovereignty would inevitably lead to a war.
Some forces are calling for employing a coercive manner such as house-search as regards the verification issue at the present phase although they are well aware that they can never succeed in it. An ulterior aim sought by them through such act is to evade their commitment to make economic compensation and justify the delayed fulfillment of their commitments by dragging on the six-party talks.
The DPRK already agreed with the proposal made by the Chinese side to resume the talks of the heads of delegations to the six-party talks on Oct. 18.
The DPRK is reacting to the delayed fulfillment of the economic compensation by five parties with the measure of cutting down half the tempo of unloading the spent fuel rods on the principle of "action for action."
In case the economic compensation continues to be delayed, the tempo of the disablement will be decreased accordingly, making it hard to predict the prospect of the six-party talks.
