The DPRK has done all it could to achieve the peaceful reunification of the country, remove the nuclear threat and the source of war from the Korean Peninsula and bring about peace and stability, he noted, and went on to say:

Its efforts, however, have not met a response from the United States.

The U.S. has dealt with the Korean issue only from the view of its Asia strategy and does not want to see the whole Korean Peninsula denuclearized.

Consequently, this only increased the nuclear threat to the DPRK.

The U.S. is behaving so arbitrarily that it asserts the DPRK should not be allowed to launch even a satellite for peaceful purposes, and the UN Security Council is being abused to serve its purpose.

The conclusion the DPRK has drawn is that in order to preserve peace and stability in Northeast Asia at the present stage where the U.S. is not willing to make a switchover in its nuclear policy, the DPRK is left with no other option but to keep the nuclear equilibrium in the region by keeping dependable nukes.

If the Korean Peninsula is to be denuclearized, it is necessary for the U.S. administration to discard its old view of confrontation and prove its stand to make a "switchover" in practice as it has stated on several occasions recently.

The DPRK does not pursue a nuclear arms race.

The mission of the DPRK's nuclear weapons is just to deter a war.

The DPRK will have only nuclear deterrent strong enough to beat back a military attack on it and cope with such threat.

As is the case with Europe and other parts of the world, on the Korean Peninsula, too, deterrent will be in direct proportion to threat.

While the DPRK keeps nuclear weapons, it will act in a responsible manner as regards their management and use and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The DPRK shares the stand with all peace-loving countries including the non-aligned countries opposed to a nuclear war, nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation.

The DPRK is exposed to "sanctions" applied in the name of the UN for the mere reason that it has nuclear deterrent.

Such unreasonable and partial sanctions can neither be recognized nor accepted.

It is the DPRK government's stand to respond to dialogue with dialogue and react to "sanctions" with increased nuclear deterrent.

If the United States intends to have dialogue, keeping "sanctions" ahead of it, the DPRK, too, will have dialogue, keeping the bolstering-up of its nuclear deterrence ahead of it.