Present there were media correspondents of various countries to the UN.

Sin made an address at the conference.

Recalling, to begin with, that the DPRK informed the UNSC member nations of its stand on the case, he said:

As already known, the south Korean authorities announced on May 20 the "results of investigation" linking the case with the DPRK.

The DPRK promptly and totally rejected the "results" and repeatedly declared that it had nothing to do with the case. And it proposed sending an inspection group of its National Defence Commission to the spot to objectively verify the "results of investigation."

However, the south Korean authorities refused to accept this just demand and referred the unilaterally worked out "results of investigation" to the UNSC.

The "results of investigation" into the case were a fabrication made by the U.S. and the south Korean authorities from A to Z. That was why the "results" aroused suspicion and criticism internally and externally from the moment they were announced. Various information and objective realities brought to light with the passage of time that the case was their politically motivated fabrication.

The south Korean authorities' announcement of the "results of investigation" on May 20 was timed to coincide with their political timetable-- the visit of the U.S. secretary of State to Japan and the start of their campaign for the "elections to local self-governing bodies".

The U.S. and south Korea claimed that the "investigation" was "objective and scientific" as it was carried out by the "multinational team" involving foreign experts. But the "team" itself and its activities were very problematic.

UK was officially requested to send information about its experts involved in the "team", but nothing has been heard from it. Canada announced on May 16, four days before the announcement of the "results" that it would send its experts, but nothing has been known when they arrived in south Korea and whether they took part in the "investigation" or not.

It was also reported that Swedish experts joined the "team" only to offer technical assistance but did not participate in the job to clarify who is to blame for the case.

The south Korean authorities produced only "material evidence" favorable for deliberately linking the case with the DPRK, but concealed all what was unfavorable for such scheme under the pretext of "military secrets". Even the produced "evidence" aroused so many doubts that the case has been regarded as a puzzle in the U.S. and south Korea and the rest of the world.

Citing in detail the points in question and facts proving the false case, he further said: This being a hard reality, the south Korean authorities hid one piece of evidence after another that might deny the DPRK's involvement or strictly removed them from the list of objects to be investigated.

Referring to such problems as the gas turbine, a key evidence allegedly proving the cause of the sinking and the letter "number 1" and to the strange movement of the south Korean military which would have been well aware of the cause of the case, the representative continued:

The assertion that the DPRK was to blame for the case was a politically motivated charade orchestrated by the U.S. and south Korea from A to Z.

It was the U.S. that got the biggest share of the windfall through the said case.

The United States used the case for pressurizing Japan into yielding to it over the issue of transfer of the U.S. military base from Okinawa, a main hurdle in the way of carrying out its Asia-Pacific strategy, under the pretext of "threat from north Korea" and thus brought about the fall of the Hatoyama regime uncomfortable for it. This case thus met two ends. Hatoyama himself admitted that the case of sinking warship was a decisive factor that compelled him to meet the U.S. demand over the issue of the U.S. forces base.

Availing itself of the case, the U.S. openly disclosed its intention to accelerate the formation of the "triangular military alliance" of the U.S., Japan and south Korea and for the present to secure a pretext for selling a large quantities of weapons to south Korea and moving its aircraft carrier to the West Sea of Korea and extend the transfer of the "right to command the wartime operations" of the U.S. forces in south Korea which had been expected in 2012.

The U.S. required the case to make its administration appear strong in the run-up to the coming intermediary election and justify its policy of "strategic patience" to deplete the environment for investment in the DPRK and stifle its economy in a sustainable manner.

The immediate aim sought by south Korea was to evade the responsibility for the case of warship sinking.

It was the calculation of the south Korean authorities that they could rally the conservative camp if they published the "results of investigation" into the case of warship "Cheonan" on May 20, the day of the start of the campaign for "the elections to the local self-governing bodies" to link the case with the DPRK and hype the "national security" as the most important pending issue for the "elections". But they suffered a defeat in the "elections" as their "north wind" proved to be counter-productive.

In spreading the story about "the torpedo attack by the north" the south Korean authorities sought a foolish aim to justify their anachronistic hard-line policy towards the DPRK, shirk off the responsibility for having pushed the inter-Korean relations to the worst phase and drive a wedge in the ties between the DPRK and China whose relations have favorably developed with each passing day.

As is known to everybody, the "crucial material evidence" produced by the U.S. and the south Korean authorities is nothing but "serious doubts" and the "results of investigation" released by the "multi-national joint investigation team" were not based on a scientific basis but cooked up to serve their purpose: it was not conducted objectively but in a biased and arbitrary manner.

Precisely for this reason the DPRK promptly refuted the "results of investigation" as soon as they were announced and proposed sending an inspection group of the National Defence Commission to the spot.

Some countries are referring to the possibility to discuss the "Cheonan" issue at the "Military Armistice Commission" but the U.S. unilaterally withdrew the senior member of the "UN forces" side and posted a "general" of the south Korean puppet army in his place in 1991 though south Korea was not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, paralyzing the function of the MAC.

The situation created on the Korean Peninsula due to the "results of investigation" published by the south Korean authorities and their reckless "follow-up countermeasures" is so grave that a war may break out any moment.

The UNSC has a shameful precedent in which it failed to prevent the Iraqi war, taken in by the lie told by the United States in February of 2003.

If the UNSC unreasonably handles this case, taken in by the U.S. lie, sparking off a clash on the peninsula, Washington and the UNSC will be wholly accountable for the ensuing consequences.

Should the aggressors dare provoke, defying the repeated warnings of the DPRK, its army and people will mercilessly react to them and make a clean sweep of them from the land of Korea and build a prosperous reunified country.