It was one day in September Juche 39 (1950), a period of the temporary strategic retreat on the part of the KPA, that Kim Il Sung advanced a strategic policy of forming the second front behind the enemy lines with KPA combined units under the unified guidance of the Supreme Command in order to bring a radical change in the situation.

At that time, standing in the frontline were 8th and 10th corps of the U.S. aggression army, with some distance between them. The western and eastern parts of the front were rugged mountainous areas and the enemy troops were advancing along the main road only.

Meanwhile, behind the enemy lines there were some units of the KPA on the way of strategic retreat from the former frontline along the Rakdong River in the south, which were accustomed to mountain conditions.

The strategic policy of forming the second front was set forth on a basis of analysis into such situation. Under this policy those KPA units formed the second front and set up their base, putting areas of several thousand square kilometers under their control.

The units in the second front intensified attacks on the enemy's strategic and operational depth, contributing to foiling the U.S. imperialists' "general Christmas offensive".

In combination with the frontline units of the KPA, they had killed or captured 31,200 enemy troops and liberated nearly 30,000 square kilometers of enemy-held areas until mid-December 1950.