The report said:

The talks between north-south high-ranking officials in Inchon on October 4 made a great contribution to creating an atmosphere favorable for improving the north-south relations.

But there occurred an undesirable incident at 10 a.m. on October 7 in which both sides opened fire at the warships of the other side in the hotspot waters in the West Sea of Korea.

Out of the sincere mind that we can no longer tolerate the repetition of such a case as chilling the hard-won atmosphere, the north side immediately sent a notice to the chief of the "security office" of Chongwadae proposing holding an emergency one-to-one contact.

But the south Korean authorities in the reply message declined the offer for the emergency contact, being keen on shifting the blame onto the north side while claiming the recent case was an unavoidable counteraction against the act of "trespassing on the line" by someone.

Despite its irrepressible disappointment at the uncouth and insincere attitude of the south side to the good faith and magnanimity, the north side, by exercising utmost patience and magnanimity, sent another notice advising the south side to think twice and respond to the proposal for the emergency contact at 1:23 a.m. on October 8.

The south Korean authorities, however, began to take an extremely insolent attitude, while keeping mum about the DPRK's sincere offer.

Although the situation developed beyond imagination, the north side, still holding out the hope, sent the third notice at around 7:10 a.m. on October 10 in order to settle the situation through an emergency contact.

In the notice the north side urged the south side to clarify its stand on choosing between the two options: Whether it is willing to keep the atmosphere for improving the north-south ties alive by responding to the north side's request for emergency contact or it will see the content of the notice sent by the north side opened to public to arouse nationwide response. The north side declared that it would be compelled to disclose before the world all the measures it has taken with sincerity so far including the content of the notices unless the south side clarifies its stand till 10 a.m. on Oct. 11.

Much upset by this, the chief of the "security office" of Chongwadae hurriedly sent a reply message to the effect that he complies with the north side's request for an emergency contact at 8:25 a.m., just one hour after the notice was sent.

The "security office" asserted that the south Korean authorities have called for paving a road for closer cooperation. While clarifying the stand to hold the second round of the high-level contact as agreed upon between the north and the south in Inchon, it didn't forget to stress the need to defend the "northern limit line".

While responding to the proposed contact, it noted that the south side would send to the contact the chief of the policy room of the "Ministry of Defense" who has no mandate, instead of the chief of the "security office" expected by the north side. Lurking behind this was a sly ulterior design to delay the emergency contact or completely abort it by forcing the north side to lower the level of its special envoy and find fault with the south side over the "level" or "status" of its special envoy.

However, the north side made a bold decision.

As a result, the north-south emergency contact was finally possible 9 days later.

The contact began in Panmunjom at 10:00 on Wednesday.

First, the north side proposed the south side to open the contact to public as it was arranged, true to the noble intention of Marshal Kim Jong Un to turn the narrow path for the improvement of the north-south relations into a wide avenue and to make a new history of north-south relations.

However, those from the south side hesitated to respond to this proposal but whispered to each other for a while before calling for keeping the contact under wraps.

As the north side appreciated that any substantial result was more important than the modality of the contact, it agreed to the south side's proposal.

The north side, to begin with, said it is the present situation that the hard-won atmosphere for the improvement of the north-south relations has been chilled by the frequent exchange of fire in the hotspot waters of the West Sea of Korea, such dishonest behavior as spreading false rumors about it and uninterrupted leaflet-scattering operations conducted against the DPRK.

It solemnly stated that the south Korean authorities are obliged to clarify its responsible attitude towards the issues of whether they seek to keep the present north-south relations frozen or to rev up the atmosphere of their improvement.

First of all, it made the following proposals to defuse the tension in southwestern waters to keep the atmosphere for improving the inter-Korean relations:

First, both sides shall take measures not to trespass on the sensitive waters and line in the southwestern part of the West Sea of Korea under any circumstances.

Second, they shall not preempt firing unless the other side perpetrates a deliberate hostile act.

Third, to do so, they shall modify their present belligerency rules which may trigger off a clash.

Fourth, both sides shall settle unexpected and complicated situation through dialogue and contact.

And the north side proposed that warships of both sides sailing to "intercept illegal fishing boats" should display promised markings to prevent accidental firing beforehand.

If the issue of reckless anti-DPRK leaflet-scattering is not strictly checked at the authorities, unexpected happenings may occur, the north side said, strongly urging the south side authorities to take necessary steps.

Contrary to such efforts of the north side to settle the issue raised, the south side behaved arrogantly from the outset of the contact.

Far from understanding the sincerity of the north side's proposal in the long run, the south side refused to discuss the proposal for no reason, misjudging it as the north side's intention to ignore the "northern limit line" like a psychopath seized with persecution mania.

The north side held that there should be an official stand on the part of the south side in order to hold the second round of high-level contact without fail by keeping the atmosphere for improving the north-south relations. Unable to reject such just assertion of the north side, the south side proposed recess to examine the north side's proposal and receive the instruction from the superior at 11:05.

At 12:00 the south side proposed resuming the contact at 2 p.m., saying that its internal discussion had not yet ended.

At the afternoon contact the south side proposed opening to media that both sides dealt with the exchange of fire in the West Sea and the issue of "scattering leaflets", claiming that the north-south emergency contact being held in camera today had already been opened to some media.

This was a volte-face in the attitude of the south side which called for holding the north-south emergency contact in camera in opposition to the north side's proposal for totally opening it to public.

The north side said that the issue of report should be decided after the contact, and urged the south side to specify its stand on the proposals made by the north side at the morning contact.

The south side's attitude discouraged the north side and lashed it into fury.

Very insolent was the attitude of the south side toward the north side's call for stopping at once the anti-DPRK leaflet-scattering.

It can be said that it is a sort of mockery and insult to the north-south dialogue that the south side sent the chief of the policy room of the "Ministry of Defense" without any right to conclude to the emergency contact.

The north side solemnly clarified that all efforts for keeping the atmosphere for improving the north-south relations alive and holding the 2nd round of high-ranking contact should be open to public to put the prevailing situation under control amid the response of all Koreans.

The south side, however, did not hide its uneasiness about the north side's intention to open the contents of the emergency contact to public, repeating such words as "crucial case" and "serious concern".

The south Korean authorities' attitude made people have serious suspicion that they intend to spend with ease the remaining tenure of their office with their hypocritical talk about dialogue and call for unification, the report said, and went on:

The south Korean authorities should give a clear-cut answer to the question put by the Koreans as to whether they would make positive efforts for the improvement of the inter-Korean relations with sincerity or while away time with farces for alluring and deceiving the nation.

They should not misjudge the sincere efforts of the DPRK to make a new history of improving the north-south relations.

It is the undeniable reality that the prospect for holding the north-south high-level contact high on agenda is gloomy.

The south Korean authorities should bear in mind that all Koreans are watching their future movement with vigilance.