As expected, the way the fools think and play in every occasion is incurring laughter of the world.

In fact, we are now watching the south Korean idiots making a show of themselves as a spectacle rather than a response.

And again, I feel an impulse to scoff at them.

As I watched yesterday alone, their speculation, guess, freewheeling assessment and so on were very disgusting.

I would like to make some cutting remarks about it.

A so-called senior researcher of a south Korean military institute appeared before the press to let loose rubbish that it took 9 hours and 22 minutes for us to conduct the missile launch after the written order on it, calculating only the time as if he had nothing to do, in a bid to undervalue the preparedness of the DPRK missile forces.

They present a variety of unusual analysis as if they are really stupid or persons of small caliber who make too much analysis.

I don't know if they would take some comfort from such farfetched defamation and assessment.

We did not make public the full text of the written order issued by our supreme leadership.

To make public one thing on this occasion, the written order on the missile launch issued on the day includes the contents that the surprise launch should be conducted at a favorable and appropriate moment in the afternoon after completely closing the area around the launching site and taking such safety steps as evacuation of personnel and other equipment in the morning.

Accordingly, our servicepersons took important military action at the most appropriate time, specified in the order--the time between 15:30 and 19:45 in consideration of visible distance under weather conditions and when seven scout planes of the enemy involved in air reconnaissance landed.

I think that the south Korean military would evidently explain, today or tomorrow and as they always used to, that they detected the sign of the north's missile launch in advance and were conducting intensive monitoring with intelligence assets.

And they will defend the fact that their scout planes didn't fly at the time by saying that they were monitoring with so-called special means and methods under "close cooperation between intelligence authorities of south Korea and the U.S." and that it is difficult to give detailed explanation for fear of possible exposure of military intelligence assets and for other reasons.

The concept of a surprise launch doesn't mean the time that it takes between the issuing of a launch order and the launching.

I cannot but mention the system of fuel ampoule.

Those, who have never made it themselves, went so absurd and stupid as to comment on other's technology at will after seeing some sci-tech data.

A so-called honorary researcher at a sci-tech policy institute made oft-repeated remarks again that the warhead's reentry appeared to be a failure judging from a photo posted by Japan.

Those absurd guys fail to distinguish a warhead from a detached second-stage projectile in the photo and seem ignorant about the reason why the distance between the two in the case of vertical launch naturally gets close.

As I explained the other day, if the warhead's reentry fails, we can't receive signals from the warhead till it has landed.

Such argument, made by those rookies who are lack of the said common sense and pretend to be experts, will not change in fact the crisis facing the U.S. and south Korea as they want and will cause confusion in getting a correct understanding of the dangerous situation, though it may bring some consolation to them.

We have possessed satisfactory technology and capability and, now will focus on increasing the quantity of their force.

They had better rack their brains to take measures to defend themselves, instead of doubting or worrying about other's technology.

We are well aware of the movement of U.S. forces' strategic strike means recently getting brisk around the Korean Peninsula.

We are carefully examining the influence it would exert on the security of our state, and we are going to make it an established fact, once again on this occasion, that we will take corresponding counteraction if it is judged to be any direct or indirect threat.

The frequency of using the Pacific as our firing range depends upon the U.S. forces' action character.

We affirm once again that there is no change in our will to make the worst maniacs escalating the tensions pay the price for their action.