In September Juche 39 (1950), he called a war council of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Supreme Headquarters to advance a strategic and tactical policy on forming a powerful second front behind the enemy lines in order to bring about a fundamental turn in the war situation.

In the world history of wars, there had been precedents that individual army units or guerrilla units conducted operations behind enemy lines to disperse the enemy forces, but no such case as the fact that the formation of the second front behind enemy lines and military activities were organized and conducted with involvement of combined units of the regular army under the unified command of the Supreme Headquarters.

Under the operational plan of the President, the second front was formed promptly by the 2nd corps of the KPA and some combined units of its main force of the KPA which had disappeared "like smoke" amid the flames of the Raktong River front.

In close contact with the people’s guerrilla units, the army units of the second front conducted vigorous guerrilla warfare, keeping pace with the attacks by the main front units, and arranged warfare by large and small forces to ensure the successful counteroffensive operations on the whole front through widespread and active combat actions in different parts.

During the first operation of the third-stage Fatherland Liberation War, they carried out big battles more than 200 times to deter as many as 100 000 enemy troops from moving to the foremost line.

By mid-December 1950, they killed, wounded or captured more than 31 200 enemy troops, liberated nearly 30 000 square kilometers of enemy-occupied areas, foiled the enemy's attempt at mid-area defence and made a big contribution to expelling the aggressors to the south of the 38th parallel.

Indeed, the President performed brilliant exploits by bringing earlier the final victory in the war with his outstanding military stratagem and rare insight.